

09 April 2025



**CHERI**


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# Securing Secure Networking tools for Morello Linux

**Joshua Lant- [joshua.lant@manchester.ac.uk](mailto:joshua.lant@manchester.ac.uk)**  
Research Associate- University of Manchester

# ○ Morello at the Edge (MoatE)




- ◆ Built commercial demonstrator system for edge computing.
- ◆ Morello acting as a secure server.
- ◆ Linux-Morello w/ Yocto Distribution.
- ◆ UoM- Enable secure networking:
  - ◆ VPN (WireGuard)
  - ◆ Firewall/Packet Filtering (Netfilter/nftables)



**Digital Security  
by Design**




# ○ WireGuard VPN




- Minimal porting effort for WireGuard itself.
  - In-kernel implementation
  - We do not deal with other implementations.
  - Only userspace configuration tools to port.
- Many configurations and tests use Netfilter.
  - Forwarding between interfaces (namespaces)
  - NAT for use as VPN gateway
  - Stateful firewall rules (conntrack/rate limiting)

# ○ nftables and Netfilter Subsystem



- ◆ De-facto standard firewall tool for Linux
- ◆ nft/iptables-nft – userspace tool for configuration
  - ◆ libnftnl- netlink programming API
    - ◆ libmnl- parsing/building netlink packets
- ◆ Netfilter is a large subsystem, highly configurable.
  - ◆ Many vulnerabilities:
    - ◆ Use-after-free, out of bounds access
    - ◆ High severity, privilege escalation
    - ◆ Several publicly posted, proven exploits (CVE-2024-1086, CVE-2023-32233, CVE-2022-1015)

# Issues with porting




- Kernel pointers in Netfilter's UAPI headers
  - Structs incorrectly sized by userspace
  - Netlink expressions padded incorrectly
  - New type required for netfilter headers

```
#ifdef CONFIG_CHERI_PURECAP_UABI
    typedef __uintcap_t __nf_kptr_t;
#else
    typedef unsigned long __nf_kptr_t;
#endif
```

```
struct xt_entry_match {
...
    struct xt_match *match;
...
}
```



```
struct xt_entry_match {
...
    union {
        struct xt_match *match;
        __nf_kptr_t __match;
    };
...
}
```



## ○ Issues with porting

- Cached kernel headers in userspace tools
  - Broken build using custom kernel header locations
    - General lack of maintenance for non-standard build configs.
- Issues building against musl-libc
- Kernel Selftests broken by purecap
  - Scripts dependent on many userspace packages.
    - Specific versions/functionality
- Several persistent ip/nftables test failures
  - time consuming to diagnose

# Network Performance


- Intel e810qc 100G cards installed

- 40-45G through copper links
  - lperf3, -P = 2
  - MTU has no effect (offload)
- 80G baseline w/ namespaces
- C64 == aarch64 performance


- WireGuard VPN

- ≈11% latency overhead from purecap, with significantly less jitter
- 2.5G for a single peer
- Large overheads seen using network namespaces?

- No throughput overhead from purecap iptables-nft




# Open Questions



- Protections beyond traditional network security?
  - What more needs to be done in-kernel?
- Wish to test on CHERI-Linux
  - Safety in the kernel
  - Additional temporal safety needed?
    - Netfilter: many use-after-free vulnerabilities
- What does purecap kernel mean for porting effort?
  - Discrepancy between user/kernel space removed
  - New challenges created, dependencies, device drivers?



# ○ Questions?



- ◆ Please find me to discuss more...
- ◆ Kernel patches available.
- ◆ User packages in open-source Yocto layer soon
  - ◆ minor modifications needed.
- ◆ Also... ask me about our other MoatE work; porting the MAMBO Dynamic Binary Modification tool.